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MARKET LIBERALISATION AND 
FOOD SECURITY IN MALAWI
B. Kandoole, B. Kaluwa, and S. Buccola1
INTRODUCTION
Since independence, Malawi has emphasised the smallholder and estate sec­
tors. They differ in terms of land tenure, type of crops grown, credit in­
stitutions, market access, and availability of extension service rather than 
in farm size. Farmers under communal land tenure cannot grow burley to­
bacco, are serviced by the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corpor­
ation (ADMARC), and have access to government extension services. On the 
other hand, estate farmers under freehold or leasehold can obtain commercial 
bank credit. Hence, the smallholder sector produces food and a limited num­
ber of export crops while the estate sector has concentrated on tobacco, 
tea, and sugar.
During the 1960s and 1970s, estate production grew much faster than 
smallholder output. Exports from estates expanded at an annual rate of 15% 
while smallholder exports recorded very little growth. The estate’s share of 
exports increased from 32% in 1967 to 65% in 1979 and reached 80% in 1981- 
82.
Emerging problems
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, significant problems emerged. Malawi’s 
terms of trade fell by 40%. Agricultural production suffered from drought, 
falling export volume, and required maize imports for the first time in vir­
tually a decade. In addition, disruption of the transport system through Mo­
zambique forced Malawi to use more costly alternative routes.
The primary causes of Malawi’s economic difficulties were transport prob­
lems and serious deterioration in the country’s terms of trade. Yet, the 
crisis also revealed important weaknesses in the economy and in the agricul­
tural development strategy. Malawi’s exports are heavily concentrated on 
the three estate-produced commodities. Unfortunately, each commodity faces 
uncertain supply and demand growth prospects for the following reasons:
o A shortage of suitable land severely limits any increase in output from 
extended acreage. Expansion will have to come from higher yields.
^Senior lecturer and lecturer, Department of Economics, University of 
Malawi; and Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
Oregon State University, respectively.
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o A growing shortage of fuelwood threatens flue-cured tobacco and tea 
production.
o A shortage of credit may become a serious constraint to expanding bur- 
ley and flue-cured tobacco production, 
o World market prospects for tobacco, tea, and sugar are poor, 
o During the recent past, expanded maize production has made a substan­
tial contribution to growth, but high transport costs and low market 
price limit prospects for exporting maize.
Government's response
Due to these and other problems, government has put added emphasis on 
smallholder food production. During the past six years, the government has 
taken significant steps to improve the agricultural marketing and pricing 
environment; particularly improving the methods of setting agricultural prices 
in order to increase smallholder returns and improve incentives for produc­
tion and diversification.
ADMARC’s operations were also improved by introducing a new manage­
ment structure, rationalizing its investments through swaps with other large 
corporations, and drawing up of comprehensive divestiture and operational 
plans. Fertilizer procurement and distribution were strengthened and a four- 
year phase-out of the fertilizer subsidy was implemented.
The rest of our discussion emphasises the smallholder sector for two rea­
sons. First, since this sector is the main producer of food crops, any analy­
sis of market liberalisation and food security must therefore concentrate on 
it. Second, the estate sector is already liberalised since it trades directly 
on world markets.
MAIZE PRICING POLICY
History of controlled marketing
Over the past 40 years, five different institutions have been created to or­
ganise agricultural marketing in Malawi.
The Maize Control Board
The origin of official control over food marketing can be traced to 1949 
when, in response to a drought, 23,608 mt of famine relief food (over half of 
it maize) were imported. In that year, the Maize Control Board was establi­
shed to control the marketing of maize grown on trust lands and to set a 
guaranteed price. Although this price was one penny per pound for a fairly 
long time (1949 to 1956), it significantly increased the importance of maize 
production as a cash crop, especially in the Central Region.
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The Produce Marketing Board
In 1952 the Maize Control Board was superseded by the Produce Marketing 
Board (PMB). It was given wider powers, including authority to purchase 
other crops such as groundnuts and beans. Maize and nonmaize purchases 
continued to grow through 1954, followed by a decline in 1955-56. Since 
surpluses were exported to Europe, falling world prices in the late 1950s led 
to a reduction of the maize producer price to 0.67 pence per pound in 1957. 
Interestingly, the price fall led to an increase in private trading activities 
and an immediate reduction in the quantity of grain offered to the board; 
from 29,056 mt in 1956 to only 4,903 mt in 1957 (British Government, 1959). 
The deficiency forced the board to purchase additional quantities from pri­
vate traders at higher prices.
The Agricultural Production and Marketing Board
The price drop was instituted by the Agricultural Production and Marketing 
Board (APMB), a 1956 amalgamation of the PMB, the Native Tobacco Market­
ing Board, and the Cotton Marketing Board. The APMB was given the task 
of providing a stable and efficient marketing system for the main cash crops 
produced on trust lands. In addition to its marketing function, the board 
was charged with providing extension advice during the growing season.
Through 1956, official policy was to pay growers a price that provided a 
"reasonable return”. Price policy changed in 1957 when minimum uniform 
preplanting prices were implemented. Producer prices were intended to be 
related to world market prices. Stabilisation around a market trend line was 
to be accomplished through a buffer stock. The board promised to purchase 
all produce offered at the official price. The board’s primary purpose was 
to act as the government’s agent in supplying industrial and urban markets 
and in maintaining a strategic reserve against the possibility of crop failure.
The Farmer Marketing Board
APMB was succeeded by yet another statutory body, the Farmers Marketing 
Board (FMB). The functions of the new board were more extensive than its 
predecessors. It was responsible for:
o marketing, processing, and disposing of agricultural products; 
o providing adequate price stability in order to protect farmers from 
world price fluctuations and increased agricultural output; 
o providing storage facilities for food reserves on behalf of government; 
and
o subsidising agricultural inputs to increase yields.
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A gricultural Development and Marketing Corporation
In 1971 the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) 
assumed FMB’s responsibilities. By this time, the board had accumulated 52 
principal storage depots throughout the country and hundreds of temporary 
bush markets. According to the Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation Act o f 1971 (Ch. 67.03 Section 5), ADMARC’s objectives were 
similar to its predecessor’s. The difference was that ADMARC was to take a 
more aggressive role in supporting agriculture. Specifically, the new board 
was charged with buying, storing, processing, adapting for sale, distributing, 
insuring, advertising, and transporting all products grown on customary lands 
for sale. In addition, the act mandated the corporation to sell produce for 
domestic consumption at prices that covered marketing costs; except when 
the government felt that a lower price was in the national interest. At any 
rate, government would reimburse ADMARC for the difference between the 
low price and the cost recovery price.
Impact o f price levels
Actually, the selling prices have nearly always been below cost recovery lev­
els. Consumer-producer price differences have been insufficient to cover 
marketing costs, especially the cost of transporting produce from rural mark­
ets to urban centres (Table 1). Maize has incurred losses in most years be­
cause of the subsidy policy, as indicated by net profits/losses on crops tra­
ded (Table 2).
Because cash crops are exported at world prices, Malawi’s rural popula­
tion has paid what Kydd and Christiansen (1982) have called an implicit tax 
(Table 2). Recently trading profits in tobacco and groundnuts have exceeded 
losses in maize and rice. The latter losses are incurred principally due to 
subsiding workers paid low wages in urban areas.
Private trading
Private trade in commodities produced by smallholders preceded official mar­
keting institutions and has always been accepted. Rules have been establish­
ed restricting activities of large and non-African traders, including upper 
limits on quantities of produce a single trader may purchase. Little inform­
ation has been gathered about the private marketing subsystem, except that 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Statistical Office collect price- 
related and private trader information at a very limited number of localities.
Status of African traders
The APMB Ordinance o f 1957 exempted African traders from restrictions 
against trading produce with fellow Africans. However, since margins
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Tabic 1. Maize prices, 1967-68 lo  1986-87. Malawi*
Free market ADMARC
Year price^ Producer price Consumer price
1967-68 39.70 20.00 40.00
1968-69 40.50 20.00 40.00
1969-70 52.70 20.00 40.00
1970-71 45.10 30.00 40.00
1971-72 48.90 30.00 40.00
1972-73 48.40 30.00 40.00
1973-74 64.20 30.00 50.00
1974-75 83.50 40.00 66.00
1975-76 91.50 50.00 66.00
1976-77 85.00 50.00 66.00
1977-78 86.20 50.00 66.00
1978-79 94-70 50.00 90.00
1979-80 122.20 66.00 90.00
1980-81 155.50 66.00 110.00
1981-82 162.60 111.00 130.00
1982-83 190.10 111.00 140.00
1983-84 196.50 122.00 140.00
1984-85 195.60 122.00 140.00
1985-86 246.50 122.00 148.50
a Prices are in Kwacha per mt.
k The free market price is based on monthly average at Blantyre and 
Lilongwe Markets.
Source: ADMARC, (various years) and National Statistical Office
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between producer and consumer prices have been small, it has not been 
worthwhile for large traders to participate in food marketing. The increase 
in private maize trade in 1957 following APMB’s price reduction indicates the 
lively state of private trade, even before independence. The Jack Report 
(Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960) welcomed this development, 
noting that the increased number of middlemen engaged in maize trade would 
offer competition, reduce excess board profits, and improve farmers’ living 
standards.
The trading network
Figure 1 shows the relationships between private trade and the marketing 
board subsystems in Malawi. Farmers sell maize to ADMARC, consumers, or 
middlemen. ADMARC may purchase maize grain from middlemen or produ­
cers, and may sell to either consumers or the Grain and Milling Company for 
processing into flour. Maize sold by smallholders to consumers in local dis­
trict council markets is in whole or processed flour form. Finally, middle­
men normally sell directly to consumers except, when commissioned they may 
also sell to ADMARC.
Contribution of private traders
Although statements of marketing board objectives give the impression they 
are monopsonists in maize marketing, the record suggests otherwise. There 
is evidence that ADMARC has often handled a small proportion of the traded 
maize surplus-6% in 1970, 26% in 1973, and 13% in 1975 (Malawi Statistical 
Yearbook; 1973, 1977, and 1978). The rest has been handled by private trad­
ers in various market places; including farmgate, local markets, district 
council markets, and urban markets. In addition, a 1982 Ministry of Agri­
culture survey indicates that some of the numerous markets at which 
ADMARC operated were shared by private traders and that there were other 
markets at which only private traders operated. Areas in which only 
ADMARC was supposed to operate were typically remote districts far from 
highly populated urban centres (i.e., Chitipa and Nsanje), or districts spe­
cialising in cash crops rather than maize (i.e., Nkhata Bay, Karonga, Nkhota- 
kota, Kasungu, and Salima). In 10 of the remaining 17 districts, markets at 
which only private traders or both ADMARC and private traders operated, 
they were in the majority (Quinten and Sterkenburg, 1975). Although some 
private traders were licensed to buy from smallholders and sell to ADMARC, 
most operated independently to supply their own customers.
Two reasons account for the high proportion of private maize trade. 
First, ADMARC sets both producer and consumer prices before the planting 
season and any produce sold to them is at the producer price. If producers
108
Figure 1. Official and unofficial »aize »arketing subsystem in Malawi.
Official s u b s y s t e m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Unofficial sabcrccet
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sell directly to consumers, either as grain or flour, they can avoid selling at 
official consumer prices since the latter do not apply to the small measuring 
instruments used in local markets. Second, consumers prefer buying directly 
from farmers because the latter mainly stock local varieties while ADMARC 
mostly handles hybrids. Local varieties are favoured over hybrids because of 
their superior taste, poundability, and storage ease.
Table 1, which depicts differences in prices between the official and un­
official trade, shows that although the absolute gap between free market 
and official consumer price has widened over time, but there has been little 
trend in the ratio of the two prices (averaging around 1.25). Only recently 
has the ratio widened considerably. Until 1987, private trade was only per­
mitted in small quantities. Thus, the large volume of private trade implies 
that many individuals have been actively involved.
EMERGING PROBLEMS IN MAIZE PRICE AND MARKETING POLICY
Government controls ARDMARC’s farm maize purchase price, domestic selling 
price, input prices, and export and import quantities. Thus, the government 
has used the marketing corporation as its principal instrument for influenc­
ing agricultural price and storage policies.
Price policy objectives
The most commonly stated objectives of Malawi’s maize producer price policy 
have been to: (a) provide incentives for smallholders to produce enough 
maize to meet domestic demand (i.e., to maintain maize self-suffciency); (b) 
guarantee a steady cash income for smallholder farmers who comprise 85% 
of the population; (c) help implement the government’s policy of diversifying 
agricultural production; (d) maintain an adequate return to ADMARC’s opera­
tions (i.e., to keep costs somewhat in line with revenues which implies pro­
ducer prices must respond to export parity prices, domestic selling prices, 
and ADMARC’s operating costs); and (e) never reduce nominal maize prices.
On the other hand, the stated objectives of maize consumer price policy 
have been to: (i) enable wage earners to consistently purchase enough maize 
for a calorie-adequate diet and (ii) maintain an adequate return to 
ADMARC’s operations (i.e., to keep revenues in line with costs which implies 
selling prices must respond to import parity prices, farm purchase prices, and 
ADMARC’s operating costs). Although unstated, we assume that a third ob­
jective, comparable to enabling wage earners to purchase a calorie-adequate 
diet, might be necessary: (iii) discourage consumers from wishing to purchase 
no more than what is domestically available (i.e., maintaining maize self-suf­
ficiency).
no
In addition, government—through ADMARC—would like to maintain a 
strategic maize reserve, sufficient to satisfy demand in low production years 
without resorting much to imports. The silos complex built in 1981 to house 
the strategic maize reserve holds 180,000 mt. Although, an optimal reserve 
level has not been identified, it would clearly depend upon the domestic buy­
ing and selling prices that prevail (Buccola and Sukume, 1988). The best 
strategic reserve must be high enough to avoid excessively large imports in 
lean years 2nd small enough to avoid excessively large storage costs.
Conflicts among objectives^
No price or stock policy can completely satisfy all these objectives because 
they usually conflict with one another. Producer price policy intentions 
themselves can be self-conflicting. For example, stabilising cash incomes (b) 
requires averaging out export parity prices over a number of years. But 
current or averaged export parity prices may be too low to induce maize 
self-sufficiency (a), or the prices may be so high that the country becomes a 
consistent maize exporter. This in turn may conflict with the diversification 
objective (c). Any one of objectives (a) through (d) may from time to time 
require reductions in nominal prices, a violation of objective (e).
Similar conflicts may occur among consumer price policy objectives. 
Consumer prices sufficient for a universally calorie-adequate diet (i) are 
often lower than those needed to maintain acceptable ADMARC operating 
revenue (ii), and perhaps too low to keep average domestic consumption 
below average domestic production (iii). Finally, consumer prices adequate 
for objective (i) may collectively be inconsistent with objectives (d) and (ii) 
(i.e., they may not generate an adequate return to ADMARC’s operations).
Faced with these dilemmas, it is no wonder that maize price policies have 
undergone several changes through the years. For example, it was often 
argued that low producer prices in the 1960s and 1970s were beneficial in 
that they discouraged farmers from selling so much of their crop at harvest, 
that they would have to buy some of it back later in the year. Yet, this 
reasoning is flawed because the seasonal pattern of producers’ sales would 
depend upon expectations of seasonal price changes, not average annual pri­
ces.
Declining ADMARC purchases
As a result of the low price, ADMARC’s domestic maize purchases in the 
1960s and 1970s were rather small (Table 3). Many farmers may have sold
2See appendix 1 for technical discussion of price administration.
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Table 3. ADM ARC maize transactions, 1969 to 1986, M alawi
Farm purchases Domestic sales Foreign trade
Quantity Quantity Imports Exports
Year Price (K /m t) (000 m t) Price(K /m t) (000 m t) (000 mt) (000 m t)
1969 20.00 85.83 40.00 127.05 NA 0
1970 20.00 54.03 40.00 59.48 NA 0
1971 30.00 36.42 40.00 51.65 NA 4.60
1972 30.00 37.01 40.00 34.00 NA 36.84
1973 30.00 64.59 40.00 50.29 NA 36.25
1974 30.00 60.12 50.00 90.76 NA 31.00
1975 40.00 65.53 66.00 NA NA 0
1976 50.00 29.16 66.00 NA NA 0
1977 50.00 65.11 66.00 NA NA 0
1978 50.00 89.84 66.00 NA NA 0
1979 50.00 120.30 90.00 NA NA 0
1980 66.00 82.40 90.00 150.70 11.20 0
1981 66.00 91.21 110.00 121.40 56.10 0.05
1982 111.00 136.59 130.00 113.90 1.20 0.05
1983 111.00 246.09 140.00 74.80 0.05 76.09
1984 122.00 244.92 140.00 193.30 0 130.73
1985 122.00 296.44 140.00 85.70 0 45.66
1986 122.00 272.28 148.50 163.80 0 32.02
NA: indicates data not available.
Source: ADMARC, (various years) Malawi Government, M inistry o f Finance, (1986)
112
their maize to small private traders or in local markets where the crop bro­
ught a better price than the one offered by ADMARC. This means the po­
licy could not have been as effective as desired in discouraging food sales. 
In an effort to boost maize purchases and increase rural incomes, the gov­
ernment increased producer price for the 1982 marketing year by 66%. This 
had the desired effect of sharply increasing smallholder maize sales to AD­
MARC and of increasing stocks above those needed to fill the new silo com­
plex. ADMARC’s operating and financial performance was strong until 1978, 
but weakened near the end of the decade. By 1982, ADMARC was unable to 
finance fertilizer procurement for the smallholder sector. This downfall was 
largely a result of policies discussed below:
Expansion into nonmarketing areas
A major source of ADMARC’s recent difficulties has been its expansion into 
fields unrelated to agricultural marketing, which has diverted financial and 
managerial energies from its principal line of work. The nonmarketing ac­
tivities generally have brought low asset returns. Plans are underway to 
resolve this problem by requiring ADMARC to revert to its primary function 
of providing marketing services to the smallholder subsector; divest itself of 
its nonagricultural, nonmarketing investments; and rehabilitate its invest­
ments in agro-processing subsidiaries.
The move will require a legal change because the Agricultural Develop­
ment and Marketing Corporation Act o f 1971 (Cap. 67.03) gave ADMARC the 
power to:
Assist any organisation, government, corporation, company or co­
operative society with capital or credit by means of investment 
in stock, shares, bonds, debentures or debenture stock, or with 
other ways or resources for the prosecution of any works, under­
takings, projects, schemes or enterprises relating to the develop­
ment or improvement of the economy of Malawi.
Strategic maize reserve
Until the government’s 1981 decision to build a strategic grain reserve, AD­
MARC’s farm maize purchases were usually roughly equal to domestic sales. 
The strategic maize reserve project was very costly. The capital cost of the 
silo complex was K15.9 million, requiring an annual interest payment of K1.0 
million in 1985-86. A silo full of grain at 1986 purchase prices costs K22.0 
million and does not bring any immediate return to ADMARC. Annual inter­
est charge on the inventory value would, at a 15% interest rate, be K4.3 
million. Finally, the annual maintenance cost is K42Q,000. All these costs 
are borne directly by ADMARC (Malawi Government, 1986).
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ADMARC’s problems have been aggravated by the large surplus stock it 
has held in addition to the strategic grain reserve. Substantial price increa­
ses since 1981 greatly increased ADMARC procurement, resulting in a surplus 
stock in excess of the 180,000 ton strategic reserve (Table 3). While it was 
possible to export surplus maize at attractive prices in the early 1980s due 
to adverse growing conditions in much of the surrounding region, surpluses 
in neighbouring countries are now depressing regional prices and making ex­
ports less profitable.
Fertilizer subsidies
ADMARC has subsidised farm inputs, such as seeds and fertilizer, by selling 
them at prices below the purchase price, plus transport and handling cost. 
The resulting losses show up on operating statements. For example, an im­
portant aspect of the Ministry of Agriculture’s National Rural Development 
Plan is to encourage smallholders to fertilize maize (particularly composite 
and hybrid varieties) in order to increase yields; thereby releasing land for 
cash crop cultivation without violating the government’s maize self- 
sufficiency objective. In addition, fertilizing smallholder cash crops such as 
tobacco and cotton would improve yields and gross margins. Because there 
is very little unused arable land in Malawi, the plan’s success depended on 
convincing farmers to adopt hybrid maize. Only the hybrids respond well to 
fertilizer, so only they can raise yields sufficiently to release more land for 
foreign exchange-earning cash crops.
The policy successfully increased fertilizer use. Between 1972-73 and 
1986-87, smallholder fertilizer purchases increased by 183%, from 23,750 to 
67,290 mt. In addition, Kirchner and Kandoole (1986) found that the fer­
tilizer subsidies succeeded in promoting fertilized hybrid maize as a cash 
crop, particularly on larger farms. However, the programme failed to en­
courage farmers to substitute local maize (planted for subsistence), for hy­
brid. Therefore, it failed to release additional land for cultivating nonmaize 
cash crops.
Promoting hybrid maize as a subsistence crop appears to have failed for 
at least two reasons. First, hybrid has different pounding and taste charac­
teristics than local maize and is more difficult to store without losses. 
Therefore, there exists a consumer preference for traditional maize 
varieties. Second, substantial maize producer price increases made maize a 
highly profitable cash crop. Farmers responded to the increased price 
incentives by producing more maize for sale. As a cash crop, hybrid maize 
has impeded the expansion of the other crops that the diversification efforts 
were designed to promote. Since hybrid maize is more responsive to 
fertilizer than are tobacco, cotton, and groundnuts, Kirchner and Kandoole
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(1986) argue that removing the fertilizer subsidy will actually promote the 
government’s diversification objective.
MARKET LIBERALISATION
The new1 Agriculture (General Purpose) Act o f 1987 essentially eliminates 
ADMARC’s quasi-monopsony in the domestic market. It allows individuals in 
the private sector to deal in produce at 1,139 markets throughout the count­
ry, some of which formerly were only operated by ADMARC. The new ar­
rangement differs from the past in that traders are now allowed to buy and 
sell any quantities they wish. Important features of the liberalised market­
ing plan are:
o Private traders must be licensed annually to operate in specified mark­
ets. This provision may be used to bar unethical traders, but possibly 
could also be employed to limit competition for ADMARC at certain 
times and places.
o Only Malawi nationals or businesses owned by Malawian citizens are 
eligible for licenses. This effectively controls operator size and 
reduces the possibility of market domination by a few foreign firms, 
o Minimum producer prices will be announced annually and ADMARC will 
be a ready buyer at these prices. ADMARC’s role will be limited to 
operating a buffer stock to maintain long-run producer price stability, 
o Maize exports will be controlled through an export licensing system. 
To ensure food self-sufficiency, the government will monitor private 
traders’ food exports. During periods of scarcity, it may be difficult 
for some traders to obtain export licenses, 
o Traders must submit monthly statements detailing prices paid and 
received and amounts bought and sold.
lik e ly  aggregate effects
One advantage of a move to private trading is that it will tend to stabilize 
incomes rather than prices. Under the government’s price policy, pre-plant­
ing prices are paid, irrespective of actual harvest size. Thus, farm incomes 
have changed in proportion to harvest volumes. Under a freer market, pri­
ces will tend to be high with poor harvests and low in good years, an in­
come stabilizing factor. Moreover, private traders tend to buy and hold 
when maize is plentiful and release stocks during seasons of scarcity, 
smoothing out interseasonal variability in stocks and scarcity prices. This 
may not work well in all years. Some argue that private traders presently 
are holding "excessive" stocks at the same time that ADMARC has imported 
maize from its neighbours. Traders’ exact holdings are unknown and the
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wisdom of their collective actions is still to be tested. Possibly, traders are 
undergoing a learning period.
The government will be able to affect ADMARC’s participation in maize 
markets through changes in its guaranteed minimum produce price. As long 
as the minimum price stays relatively low, ADMARC will make maize pur­
chases only in high production years when free market prices are low and 
close to the ADMARC price. Hopefully, increased competition with ADMARC 
will drive down marketing costs, as traders seek to reduce unnecessary ex­
penditures in their search for higher income. In the long run, this should 
increase real producer prices.
At the same time, factors which we have thus far held constant will also 
change. First, fertilizer prices will increase with the four-year subsidy 
phase-out. This will reduce fertilizer purchases and hence maize yields, re­
ducing quantities that farmers offer traders at any given producer price. 
Yield reductions will likely encourage farmers to switch to less fertilizer- 
responsive crops such as groundnuts, further reducing maize supply. Lib­
eralisation-related maize price increases may be viewed as dampening this 
supply reduction effect to some extent.
Second, government is also legalizing private trade in groundnuts, pulses, 
and other nonmaize foods. If liberalisation increases long-run producer pri­
ces for these commodities as well, the net effect on maize-nonmaize price 
ratios will be uncertain. For example, the effect would depend on the de­
gree of trader competition in maize, relative to nonmaize products. The 
long-run effects of liberalisation on consumer maize-nonmaize price ratios 
are similarly difficult to predict a priori.
Likely disaggregated effects
Together, these observations suggest market liberalisation will promote long- 
run food security—provided government maintains adequate minimum producer 
prices. Liberalisation implies a long term reduction in government subsidies 
to the food sector, which will free resources for other productive enterpri­
ses. However, reducing subsidies will hurt poor consumers and farmers with 
inadequate resources to respond to the new incentives created by liberalisa­
tion. Thus, there is a need to investigate the welfare impacts of these poli­
cies. One approach is to develop profiles of smallholders who are most nu­
tritionally at risk and to investigate likely short and long-run effects of 
liberalisation on these farmers. Some salient characteristics of smallholders 
that will serve as a background for such a study are discussed below.
A Ministry of Agriculture survey (1985) indicated that 23% of the sampled 
rural households had landholdings of less than 0.5 ha. (Table 4).
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The average holding was just over 1.0 ha. Only 14% of the households had 
greater than 2.0 ha. this 14% operated about 35% of the cultivated land. 
The household income section of Table 4 shows that income from all farm 
sources rises with size of landholding. However, there is roughly an inverse 
relationship between off-farm income and farm size, suggesting that some 
individuals with small holdings may work for those with larger ones during 
part of the year. Average income of a household with more than 3.0 ha. is 
nine times that of someone with less than 0.5 ha., and five times that of 
someone with 0.5-1.0 ha. Households with smaller holdings also have less 
family and hired labour, use less fertilizer, and receive less frequent exten­
sion services than those with larger farms.
All these factors contribute to poor food balances for individuals with 
smaller farms, as shown by the food balances section of Table 4. Those 
with the smallest holdings have a 76% home-produced calorie balance defic­
iency; and this deficiency decreases with size of holding. Only households 
with more than 2.5 ha. (7.7% of those sampled) are net food sellers. These 
are the farmers who earn higher incomes when farm prices rise. The re­
mainder (92.3%) are unlikely to benefit immediately since they will have to 
buy any supplementary food at higher prices. A crucial factor which this 
table does not explicitly show is the absolute ability of households to pro­
vide a calorie adequate diet out of home production and off-farm income. 
However, it is clear the government should target food assistance towards 
those with the smaller landholdings.
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Appendix 1
TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF PRICE ADMINISTRATION
A  theory o f administered producer prices
Experience has shown that it is difficult to control maize prices 
intelligently, even if it were possible to enforce the controls in the face of 
extensive petty trading. The difficulty arises because prices are meant to 
satisfy two kinds of objectives. First, they are meant to influence
quantities of maize produced, marketed, and consumed. Second, they are 
intended to affect the real incomes and risks faced by producers, middlemen, 
and consumers, it is not easy for government to know how such quantities 
and incomes should be distributed, let alone how a given set of prices will 
distribute them.
Consider, for example, the simple case where there are only quantity-type 
objectives. Government has a target maize quantity, Q°, which it wishes to 
purchase in the next marketing year. The target may be determined as:
(1) Q °=  E(Qd)+ C[Var(Qd),Pw] - S
where E(Q^) is the quantity consumers are expected to wish to
purchase at the given selling price;
C is a safety margin (reflecting the variability of consumer 
demand and perhaps the wish to export some maize, itself a 
function of world price (Pw);
S is a carryover stock from the previous season.
In order to obtain Q ° from farmers, a producer price must be paid 
that will induce farmers to sell Q°. Ignoring risks, let the smallholder maize 
supply function be:
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(2) E(QS) = f(Pf, Z)
where Z  is the other factors (e.g. weather and groundnut prices)
affecting supply.
Suppose now the maize demand function is:
(3) E(Qd) = h(Ps, X)
where Ps is maize consumer price and X represents other demand
factors such as wages. Substituting (3) into (1), solving (2) for 
pf, then substituting (1) into the inverted form of (2) gives:
(4) Pf = f ' 1(Q°, Z) = f ^[(Mp*, X) + C - S), Z],
That is, the desired producer price depends upon all the factors affecting 
domestic supply and demand (including the consumer selling price), world 
prices, and reserve stocks. A similar model can be developed to show the 
complexity of administering consumer prices.
Producer price administration in practice
A feeling for how the Malawi government has tackled this difficult problem 
can be had by regressing ADMARC producer and consumer prices against 
some of the factors shown in equation (4). Specifically, we used linear 
ordinary least squares to regress the following:
Dependent Maize Producer Price Maize Consumer Price
Variable
Independent
Variables
ADMARC Stocks 
Maize Market Price 
Chicago Corn Price 
Consumer Price Index 
Cotton Producer Price 
Groundnut Producer Price 
ADMARC Ammonium Sulfate Price
ADMARC Stocks 
Maize Market Price 
Chicago Corn Price 
Consumer Price Index 
Per Capita Monthly Wage
ADMARC stocks were closing stocks on March 31. Maize market prices 
were annual averages of those received by petty traders in local markets. 
Chicago corn prices were expressed in MWK/ton using official MWK/US S
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exchange rates. The consumer price index (CPI) reflected low income 
market baskets in Blanlyre. Ammonium sulfate price proxied for cash costs 
of production. Per capita monthly wages were for formal sector wage 
earners only. In this preliminary analysis, no accounting was taken of 
informal sector incomes, profits, or smallholder farm income. Annual 
averages of variables were utilised from 1970-71 to 1986-87.
The most striking relationship we found was between the CPI on the one 
hand and maize producer and consumer prices on the other hand. The 
correlation coefficient (r) between the CPI and each price was about 0.97, 
suggesting prices predominantly have responded to living costs. As one 
would expect, the CPI also was highly correlated with all the other Malawi 
prices and with wages. Consequently, the use of prices in undeflated form 
results in severe collinearity and obscures underlying relationships. We 
therefore deflated prices and wages with the CPI in subsequent analysis.
The only factors found significantly to have affected real ADMARC 
producer prices were domestic maize market prices and Chicago corn prices 
(R^ was 0.35). Nonsignificance of cotton and groundnut producer prices was 
surprising because one would expect the maize producer price to be 
determined relatively to incentives provided for these other commodities. 
However, all domestic agricultural prices probably are determined 
simultaneously so the present single-equation specification is likely an 
oversimplification. The fertilizer price was nonsignificant, perhaps because 
the CPI already largely reflects annual changes in farm production costs 
(i.e., real fertilizer prices have not varied much until very recently). Hence, 
the hypothesis that producer prices have responded to farm production costs 
is not contradicted. Nonsignificant effect of ADMARC carryover stocks on 
producer prices may be the most surprising of all: one would think that 
when stocks are low, government would offer higher real producer prices (as 
ADMARC reports claimed happened in the early 1980s). Perhaps government 
has on average been unwilling to allow reserve stock instability to 
destabilise producer prices. This would be consistent with objectives (b) and 
(e), though in some cases it would work against objectives (a), (c) and (d) 
described on page 109.
Estimated elasticities of producer price with respect to the two 
statistically significant factors, domestic maize market price and Chicago 
price, were (at sample means) 0.38 and 0.25, respectively. This means, for 
example, that a 10.0% increase in the Chicago price has on average resulted 
in a 2.5% increase in ADMARC producer prices. Thus, maize producer price 
indeed has been stabilised relative to this particular measure of world price, 
a result one would expect given Malawi’s relative geographic isolation and 
application of the price stabilisation objective.
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Consumer price administration in practice
The only factor that significantly affected real ADMARC consumer prices 
was ADMARC stocks (R^ was 0.12). Nonsignificance of real wages probably 
arises from the chance negative correlation between real wages and stocks. 
Nonsignificance of domestic maize market and Chicago corn prices may 
partly arise from colinearity, although we suspect it is owing also to 
government’s strong. emphasis on objective (i)--the consumer price 
stabilisation objective. ADMARC reserve stock levels do tend to be 
negatively related to the subsequent year’s announced consumer price. 
Hence there has been some tendency for government to reduce large reserves 
by offering a consumption incentive or to discourage consumption in order to 
protect low reserves. But these effects have not been great. A 10.0% stock 
increase was associated with only a 0.5% reduction in consumer price, the t- 
value for the relationship being -1.44. The principal thing that can be said, 
in fact, about ADMARC’s consumer maize price is that it has responded 
positively to living costs. Insensitivity of consumer prices to other supply 
and demand factors partly accounts for ADMARC’s financial difficulties.
There has been no statistically significant autoregressive behaviour in 
Malawi’s real producer or consumer maize prices. Thus, for instance, real 
maize prices have followed no cyclical pattern of a type that an 
autoregressive model could uncover. This suggests that when setting prices, 
the Malawi government at least has been aware of the information content 
of past real prices. Price instability that would arise from ignorance of this 
information apparently has been avoided. This does not necessarily imply 
that ADMARC prices have adequately incorporated nonmaize price 
information. Indeed, the nonsignificance of numerous nonmaize price 
variables in the above regressions suggests Malawi maize prices have not 
embodied all the information that they should have. It remains to be seen 
whether, given enough time, a liberalised market will perform better than 
the old controlled one.
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